

Trip to Middle East and Europe 12/29/77-1/6/78. No 2

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WITHDRAWAL SHEET (PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES)

FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
memo	From Jordan to The President (6 pp.) re: Meeting With Sadat opened per RAC NLC-126-10-15-2-2, 3/26/13	UNDATED	A
telegram	From Vance to Brzezinski (2 pp.) re: Dyan's Meeting with the Shah OPENED 8/10/93	12/30/77	A
telegram	From Vance to Atherton (1 page) re: Jordanian Reaction to Begin's Plan opened per RAC NLC-126-10-15-3-1, 3/26/13	12/30/77	A
telegram	From Kyros to Wise (1 page) re: Message from the Shah opened per RAC NLC-126-10-15-2-7, 3/26/13	12/29/77	A
telegram	From Aaron to Brzezinski (1 page) re: Energy Remarks opened per RAC NLC-126-10-15-5-9, 3/26/13	1/6/78	A
telegram	From Blumenthal to The President re: Exchange Markets (2 pp.) opened per RAC NLC-126-10-15-6-8, 3/26/13	1/2/78	A
telegram	From Jordan to The President (2 pp.) re: Meeting With Sadat opened per RAC NLC-126-10-15-8-6, 3/26/13	12/30/77	A
telegram	From Mondale to The President (1 page) re: Return of Crown of St. Stephen opened per RAC NLC-126-10-15-1-3, 3/26/13	1/2/78	A
telegram	From Kyros to Wise (1 page) re: Message from the Shah opened per RAC NLC-126-10-15-4-0, 3/26/13	12/29/77	A
memo	From Vance to The President (4 pp.) re: Meeting with King Hussein in Tehran opened per RAC NLC-126-10-15-1-3, 3/26/13	UNDATED	A
telegram	From Blumenthal to The President (1 page) re: Exchange Stabilization Fund opened per RAC NLC-126-10-15-3-1, 3/26/13	1/4/77	A

FILE LOCATION

Carter Presidential Papers- Staff Offices, Office of the Staff Sec., Pres. Hand-writing File Trip to the Mideast and Europe 12/29/77-1/6/78 No. [2]

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MEMORANDUM FOR:

THE PRESIDENT

FROM:

Cyrus Vance *cv*

SUBJECT:

Your Meeting with Robert Fabre

(Pronounced: FAB-RUH

Speaks no English

Address as: Monsieur le Depute)

Your Objectives - To affirm our desire to see democratic forces in Europe, including the Left Radical Party, flourish and, while emphasizing our serious concern at the prospect of any Communist participation in the French Government, to encourage Robert Fabre in his role as a voice of realism and moderation on the French left.

Fabre's Objectives - To maintain and enhance his political identity as leader of the "other component" of the democratic left and to assure you that the Left Radicals will not be coerced by either Socialists or Communists to support policies which are not their own.

The Left Radicals and the Union of the Left - Robert Fabre is one of the true "personalities" on the French political scene, a pharmacist (still practicing) turned national politician. Mayor of his small hometown in south-central France since 1953 and deputy since 1962, Fabre's real reputation stems from his role as President of the Left Radical Party (MRG), the junior member (2-3% of the vote, 13 out of 491 deputies), in the Union of the Left with the much larger Socialist and Communist parties. Although signatories of the Common Program, the Left Radicals differ from their political allies in being at heart more centrist and much less Marxist-oriented, particularly on economic questions (where they emphasize the private sector) and international affairs (where they are more Atlanticist). However, the MRG is ready to govern in a Left coalition including Socialists and Communists.

Fabre's problem since 1972 has been to preserve the identity of his movement in the midst of a political union where his electoral importance is small, but potentially critical. He has done so with some success, largely through high visibility public actions which demonstrate that the MRG is an independent actor on the political scene. It was Fabre, for example, who literally pushed Communist leader

Marchais away from the microphone on September 14 to announce that the Left Radicals were breaking off negotiations on the Common Program because of Communist intransigence. Since that time, Fabre's popularity has climbed while that of Mitterand and Marchais has steadily declined.

The Left Radicals, although small, have a potentially important role to play in French politics, regardless of who wins next March. Within a Left government, the MRG would serve as a conservative restraining force on Socialist programs, using as leverage the "hinge" votes necessary for a parliamentary majority. Should the Left fail, the Left Radicals could be enticed to leave the Union of the Left (although the party would almost surely split into factions) in favor of President Giscard's idea of an expanded and centrist-oriented majority.

Your Meeting - Fabre wants simply to pay his respects while marking his independent stature as a political leader who does not live in Mitterand's shadow. He may seek to convince you that the Left Radicals share many of our basic concerns: a distrust of the Communists, emphasis on the free enterprise system, and a strong commitment to Western defense efforts and to European development.

Points to be Made:

-- Because France occupies such a vital position, we would regret any development which divided or weakened France, created uncertainty regarding France's basic orientation or limited France's ability to work with its friends and allies.

-- At the same time we firmly believe that Western society must move toward more egalitarian social and economic forms if it is to retain its vigor and creativity. We are promoting change in our own country, and we have no intention of seeking to frustrate it in others.

-- While of course we will respect any democratic decision in any country, as you know we are concerned about Communist participation in an allied government.

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FOREIGN MEDIA REACTION REPORT -- PRESIDENT'S TRIP - IV (TAKE ONE OF FOUR)

FOLLOWING IS A REPORT OF FOREIGN MEDIA REACTION AS OF NOON EST JANUARY 1, 1978, PREPARED BY THE UNITED STATES INFORMATION AGENCY. THE PRESIDENT'S TRIP CONTINUED TO DRAW TOP ATTENTION IN THE MEDIA, WITH MOST EMPHASIS BEING GIVEN TO MIDDLE EAST NEGOTIATIONS AND THE PRESIDENT'S ASSISTANCE IN THAT AREA.

BRITAIN

CARTER: FRONTPAGE COVERAGE

BRITISH QUALITY PRESS GAVE FRONTPAGE COVERAGE TO MR. CARTER'S TRIP SUNDAY. THE SUNDAY TIMES FRONTPAGED A PHOTO OF THE PRESIDENT AND THE SHAH; OTHER PAPERS GAVE SIMILAR TREATMENT BUT PLACED MOST EMPHASIS ON MIDDLE EAST NEGOTIATIONS.

MID-EAST EVENTS: "MOVING AT DIZZYING SPEED"

CORRESPONDENT STEPHEN BARBER IN THE SUNDAY TELEGRAPH SAID THAT "EVENTS ON THE GROUND IN THE SHAPE OF NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN EGYPT AND ISRAEL ARE MOVING AT SUCH DIZZYING SPEED AS TO TIE IN RATHER NEATLY WITH THE TOUR." REPORTER QUOTED FROM PRE-TOUR BRIEFING BY DR. BRZEZINSKI, SAID: "THE DRIFT OF CARTER-BREZEZINSKI THINKING CAN BE JUDGED FROM THE FOLLOWING PASSAGE FROM THE POLICY ADVISER'S BRIEFING: 'IT SO HAPPENS THAT BY THE END OF THIS CENTURY, AMONG THE TOP 12 COUNTRIES IN THE WORLD IN TERMS OF POPULATION AND, PERHAPS OTHER INDICES, THERE WILL NOT BE A SINGLE WESTERN POWER EXCEPT THE UNITED STATES.'"

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THE SUNDAY TIMES SAID MANY PERSONS ARE WRONG IN FEELING THERE HAS BEEN NO MOVEMENT SINCE THE SADAT-BEGIN CHRISTMAS MEETING. THE PAPER SAID ONE MAIN CHANGE IS THAT SOME PERSONS "CAN FOR THE FIRST TIME IN MOST OF THEIR LIVES, MEET AND TALK TO EACH OTHER AS FELLOW HUMAN BEINGS..." THE PAPER REMINDED READERS THAT PLANS NOW PUT FORWARD ARE "NEGOTIATING POSITIONS, AND THAT THESE WILL IMPROVE AS THE BARGAINING PROCEEDS...A FULL-SCALE INDEPENDENT PALESTINE, UNDER ANY LEADERSHIP AT PRESENT LIKELY, IS, WHATEVER THEY MAY SAY IN PUBLIC, AS UNACCEPTABLE TODAY TO SYRIA, JORDAN, LEBANON AND EGYPT (NOT TO MENTION THEIR BANKER, SAUDI ARABIA) AS IT WOULD BE TO ISRAEL."

"COURAGEOUSLY TACKLING LONG-TERM PROBLEMS"

THE INDEPENDENT LONDON OBSERVER WROTE THAT THE PRESIDENT "IS COURAGEOUSLY TACKLING LONG-TERM PROBLEMS OF AMERICAN POLICY THAT HIS PREDECESSORS IGNORED OR DEFERRED AS POLITICALLY INSOLUBLE OR MERELY CHIPPED AWAY AT ROUND THE EDGES." THE PAPER MENTIONED WELFARE AND URBAN RENEWAL AT HOME ALONG WITH INTERNATIONAL PROBLEMS SUCH AS A NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL TREATY.

(NOTE: NO LONDON NEWSPAPERS WILL PUBLISH JANUARY 2)

FRANCE

TRIP MAJOR FRENCH TOPIC

PRESIDENT CARTER'S TRIP WAS THE MAJOR FOREIGN TOPIC IN FRENCH MEDIA ON SATURDAY. (NO FRENCH PRESS PUBLISHED JANUARY 1.) SAMPLE HEADLINES: "DRAMATIC DEVELOPMENT; CARTER EXPECTED TO GO TO EGYPT (LE MATIN)"; "MIDDLE EAST: CARTER OUT TO RESCUE PEACE (LE QUOTIDIEN)"; "CARTER'S MOMENT OF EMOTION BEFORE THE MONUMENT TO THE WARSAW GHETTO (FIGARO)".

THE VISIT WAS GIVEN FULL FACTUAL COVERAGE WITH BOXES ANNOUNCING THAT THE PRESIDENT WILL HAVE A CONVERSATION WITH MR. MITTERAND JANUARY 5.

RICHARD LISCIA IN LE QUOTIDIEN DE PARIS WROTE THAT "THE REAL MAJOR INTERNATIONAL PROBLEM AT THIS TURN-OF-THE-YEAR PERIOD IS NEITHER POLAND, NOR INDIA, NOR EVEN IRAN. IT IS THE MIDDLE EAST ... (THE PRESIDENT) HAS NOT BEEN LONG IN REALIZING THAT, IF HE WANTED TO MAKE HIS TRIP AN EVENT, HE HAD TO INSERT IT INTO A MORE IMMEDIATE, MORE THRILLING ISSUE IN THE NEWS."

LE MATIN SAID THAT THE PRESIDENT'S VISIT TO POLAND "ESPECIALLY RESULTS IN THE GRANTING OF A RELATIVE GOOD CONDUCT CERTIFICATE TO WARSAW IN THE MATTER OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND IN A TWO-HUNDRED MILLION DOLLAR EXTENSION TO THE THREE HUNDRED MILLION DOLLARS WHICH THE U.S. HAD PLANNED TO GIVE TO POLAND. THIS AID CAN ONLY HELP TO STABILIZE THE REGIME."

(END TAKE ONE)

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Page 3.

WEST BERLIN

U.S. WOULD NEVER INTENTIONALLY START A WAR

WEST BERLIN PAPERS GAVE PROMINENT COVERAGE TO PRESIDENT'S DEPARTURE FROM WARSAW, CITING HIS DINNER REMARK THAT U.S. WOULD NEVER INTENTIONALLY START A WAR AND HIS EXPCSSSED BELIEF THAT SIMILAR HUNGER FOR PEACE WOULD KEEP POLAND AND USSR FROM STARTING ONE. PAPERS ALSO MENTIONED POLISH CIVIL RIGHTS DEMONSTRATORS' SHOUTS OF "CARTER, CARTER, SAVE US." PRO-SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC SPANDAUER VOLKS-BLATT ALSO CITED GIEREK'S CALLING TALKS CONSTRUCTIVE.

INDEPENDENT DER TAGESSPIEGEL IN YEAR-END REVIEW PICKED PRESIDENT CARTER AS FIRST OF THREE MOST OUTSTANDING MEN OF 1977 ALONG WITH SCHMIDT AND SADAT. THE PAPER SAID "SPEAKING UP FOR HUMAN RIGHTS HAS BEEN CARTER'S MOST IMPRESSIVE INITIATIVE," MARKING HIS "WAY OF THINKING AND HIS MORAL INTEGRITY." PRESIDENT'S INITIATIVE HAS "D WEST OUT OF IDEOLOGICAL DEFENSIVE" AND "STRENGTHENED SELF-CONFIDENCE OF WESTERN WORLD."

INDEPENDENT BERLINER MORGENPOST NOTED THE PRESIDENT FULFILLED "MANY A PROMISE" AFTER INAUGURATION, BUT SAID "IN SECOND HALF OF YEAR MANY OF HIS INITIATIVES WERE OVERRUN, CORRECTED OR IGNORED BY DEVELOPMENTS." PAPER DECLARED "HUMAN RIGHTS ARE NO LONGER GIVEN SAME IMPORTANCE AS YEAR AGO." IN FOREIGN POLICY, PAPER SAID "AMATEUR CARTER LACKS A PROFESSIONAL OF KISSINGER TYPE" WHO COULD "PIN DOWN THE PRESIDENT TO A CLEAR COURSE." PAPER CHARACTERIZED 1977 AS "YEAR OF LEARNING" FOR PRESIDENT, CONCLUDING "WE KNOW HE IS IN A POSITION TO LEARN QUICKLY."

WEST GERMANY

TELEVISION PICTURE COVERAGE OF PRESIDENT'S TRIP CONTINUED, ALONG WITH NEWS REPORTS ON PRESIDENT SADAT'S INVITATION TO VISIT EGYPT. TV COMMENTATOR GUENTER SCHUBERT SUMMED UP THE WARSAW VISIT: "IF THERE WAS NO INCIDENT IT WAS ABOVE ALL DUE TO THE RESOLVE OF BOTH SIDES NOT TO ENDANGER THE PROCESS OF DETENTE....DURING THESE LAST DAYS IN WARSAW THE IDEA OF DETENTE SURVIVED ALL DANGERS STEMMING FROM IDEOLOGICAL FANATACISM. THIS IS PROBABLY THE MOST IMPORTANT OUTCOME OF THIS VISIT."

NO MAJOR DAILIES ARE PUBLISHED ON SUNDAYS IN WEST GERMANY.

IRAN

MEDIA APPLAUDED U.S.-IRAN FRIENDSHIP

IRANIAN MEDIA COVERAGE OF THE PRESIDENT'S VISIT WAS EXTENSIVE. ARRIVAL CEREMONIES, DINNER AND TOASTS AND DEPARTURE ACTIVITIES WERE BROADCAST LIVE ON IRANIAN TELEVISION. MRS. CARTER WAS INTERVIEWED FOLLOWING HER VISIT TO THE REZA ABBASI MUSEUM; TAPE OF INTERVIEW WILL BE TELECAST JANUARY 1. COMMENTARY WAS HIGHLY LAUDATORY

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THE ENGLISH-LANGUAGE TEHRAN JOURNAL PUBLISHED A 16-PAGE SUPPLEMENT EMPHASIZING COOPERATION BETWEEN IRAN AND THE U.S.. THE LEAD EDITORIAL WAS TITLED "A WELCOME VISIT" AND EMPHASIZED THAT PRESIDENT'S STOP IN TEHRAN SHOWED IRAN'S EMERGENCE AS A MAJOR WORLD POWER.

"AMERICA NEEDED A LEADER"

SATURDAY EVENING'S PERSIAN-LANGUAGE ETTELAAT APPLAUDED THE PRESIDENT'S EFFORTS TO CHANGE THE WORLD'S IMAGE OF AMERICA, SAYING THAT "AMERICA NEEDED A LEADER WHO BELIEVED IN MORAL PRINCIPLES, FREEDOM, PEACE, AND HUMANITY. ON THE BASIS OF THESE NEEDS AMERICA ELECTED JAMES EARL CARTER...HIS ELECTION WAS JUSTIFIED. CARTER'S SINCERE SMILE SOON CHANGED THE SOUR FACES TO SMILING AND HOPEFUL ONES."

THE PAPER ADDED THAT "IN RESPECT TO IRAN-AMERICAN RELATIONS THERE HAS ALWAYS BEEN THE INDICATION OF A CONTINUOUS FRIENDSHIP BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES. THE U.S., IN HER RELATIONS WITH IRAN, ALWAYS HAS BEEN A SINCERE FRIEND."

SAUDI ARABIA

MOST RIYADH DAILIES HEADLINED DEATH OF KUWAIT RULER AND RELATED DEVELOPMENTS. PRESIDENT'S MEETING WITH HUSSEIN FEATURED IN ONLY ONE NEWSPAPER, OKAZ, WITH PRESIDENT'S STATEMENT THAT U.S. WOULD NOT IMPOSE SETTLEMENT. SAUDI RADIO AND DAILIES REPORTED ASWAN STOP WITHOUT COMMENT.

INCREASING PESSIMISM ON MIDDLE EAST DEVELOPMENTS IS REFLECTED IN THE SAUDI PRESS. AL-RIYADH SAID "ARABS HAVE NOTHING LEFT TO OFFER" AND CALLED FOR "INTENSIVE EFFORTS TO REGAIN WHAT WE HAVE ALREADY LOST." AL-MEDINA STATED THERE WAS "NO ALTERNATIVE TO TOTAL LIBERATION AND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A PALESTINIAN STATE" AND NOTED THAT THE PALESTINIAN STRUGGLE IS "PASSING THROUGH A VERY DARK AND DELICATE PHASE...REQUIRING EFFECTIVE STEPS." ANOTHER ARTICLE

IN THE SAME NEWSPAPER SAID THAT REGAINING ARAB LANDS WOULD NOT END THE CONFLICT, WHICH IT SEES AS BEING "BETWEEN TWO CULTURES... COEXISTENCE IS IMPOSSIBLE." THE PAPER CONCLUDED THAT "PARTIAL SOLUTIONS WILL LEAVE A GREAT TRAGEDY TO FUTURE GENERATIONS."

(END TAKE TWO)

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PRAVDA: "CONTRADICTORY ELEMENTS"

AS REPORTED BY TASS SUNDAY, PRAVDA'S NEWS ANALYST SERGEI VISHNEVSKY NOTED "CONTRADICTORY ELEMENTS" IN U.S. FOREIGN POLICY. AND LINKED THESE TO THE PRESIDENT'S TRIP. HE ASSERTED THAT ALTHOUGH WESTERN LEADERS ARE "COMPELLED" BY CIRCUMSTANCES TO A DETENTE COURSE, THEY "EXHIBIT NOW AND THEN NOSTALGIA FOR 'PAX AMERICANA' AND MAKE ATTEMPTS TO RECAPTURE LEADERSHIP AND TO HOLD BACK, WHEREVER POSSIBLE, THE ADVANCE OF THE PROGRESSIVE FORCES." AMONG THE "CONTRADICTORY" PURPOSES OF THE PRESIDENT'S TRIP, VISHNEVSKY CITED DISCUSSIONS ON PROBLEMS OF DETENTE, CAPITALIST ECONOMIC AND ENERGY DIFFICULTIES, "POINTLES

S DISCUSSIONS ON 'HUMAN RIGHTS' AS WELL AS TALKS ON STRENGTHENING NATO AND "DEPLOYING NEUTRON WEAPONS IN WESTERN EUROPE." IN ADDITION, THE COMMENTATOR SAID, THE UNITED STATES IS "TRYING TO IMPOSE THE UNACCEPTABLE 'BEGIN PLAN' ON INDIVIDUAL ARAB LEADERS." PRAVDA CONCLUDED THAT "NO MANEUVERS AND INTRIGUES CAN STOP IN THIS AGE THE INVINCIBLE MOVEMENT OF THE PEOPLES FOR NATIONAL LIBERATION."

SATURDAY TASS REPORTED THE BANQUET REMARKS OF GIEREK AND PRESIDENT CARTER, LEADING OFF WITH GIEREK'S STATEMENT TO THE EFFECT THAT POLISH-AMERICAN COOPERATION SERVES MUTUAL INTERESTS AND INTENSIFIES THE DETENTE PROCESS. THE REPORT CITED THE PRESIDENT AS EXPRESSING HIS SATISFACTION ABOUT THE VISIT AND QUOTED HIM DIRECTLY AS SAYING "I AM NOW MORE DEEPLY CONVINCED THAN BEFORE THAT PEOPLES SUCH AS THE POLISH AND THE SOVIET WILL NEVER BE THE FIRST TO START WARS." IT ALSO CITED HIS REMARKS ON THE EXPANSION OF CONSULTATIONS AND COOPERATION BETWEEN EAST AND WEST AND ON U.S.-SOVIET EFFORTS TO ACHIEVE NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL.

JAPAN

A NEW AWARENESS OF HUMAN RIGHTS

INDEPENDENT-MODERATE DAILY YOMIURI RAN A YEAR-END ASSESSMENT OF HUMAN RIGHTS DIPLOMACY IN ITS ENGLISH-LANGUAGE EDITION DECEMBER 29. THE PAPER GAVE CREDIT TO PRESIDENT CARTER FOR WORLD-WIDE PUBLIC AWARENESS OF THE HUMAN RIGHTS ISSUE. DESPITE "ANXIETY AND ANGER" ENGENDERED INITIALLY BY HUMAN RIGHTS DIPLOMACY, THE PAPER SAID IN RETROSPECT, "WE HAVE TO CONCLUDE THAT IT NEITHER CAUSED GREAT CONFUSION NOR THE INTENSIFICATION OF CONFRONTATION." IT ASSERTED THAT ONE REASON FOR THIS WAS THE LACK OF "TOTAL COMMITMENT" IN APPLICATION OF THE POLICY, FOR EXAMPLE WITH RESPECT TO LARGE OIL-PRODUCING COUNTRIES. IT STATED THAT THE PRESIDENT WAS "NOT REALLY FIRM IN CONFRONTING THE COMMUNIST COUNTRIES ON THE PROBLEM OF HUMAN RIGHTS." NEVERTHELESS, THE PAPER NOTED SUCH "BENEFICIAL RESULTS" AS "THE RELEASE OF MANY POLITICAL PRISONERS IN LATIN AMERICA, INDONESIA AND SOUTH KOREA." IT CITED THE NOBEL AWARD TO AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, THE GROWTH OF DISSIDENT MOVEMENTS IN COMMUNIST COUNTRIES, AND CHANGES OF REGIME IN INDIA AND PAKISTAN AS INDICATIVE OF A NEW AWARENESS OF HUMAN RIGHTS.

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IRAN

SHAH PRAISED CARTER VISIT

RADIO TEHRAN'S DOMESTIC PERSIAN-LANGUAGE SERVICE BROADCAST JANUARY 1 AN AIRPORT QUESTION AND ANSWER SESSION WITH AMERICAN AND IRANIAN REPORTERS WHICH THE SHAH HELD FOLLOWING THE DEPARTURE OF THE PRESIDENTIAL PARTY. IN ANSWERS TO AN AMERICAN CORRESPONDENT'S QUESTION, THE SHAH WAS QUOTED AS SAYING THAT KING HUSSEIN'S WILLINGNESS TO JOIN MIDDLE EAST PEACE TALKS IS DEPENDENT ON WHETHER HE IS GIVEN A MEANINGFUL ROLE.

THE AMERICAN (CBS) CORRESPONDENT ASKED IF THE SHAH "PERSUADED" KING HUSSEIN TO JOIN THE PEACE TALKS. THE SHAH REPLIED: "I WILL PERSUADE HIM TO JOIN THE PEACE TALKS IF HE IS GIVEN SOME RESPONSIBILITY...RESPONSIBILITY TO FULFILL THE ROLE OF HIS COUNTRY'S REPRESENTATIVE. I ALLUDE TO UN RESOLUTIONS IN THIS CONNECTION SO THAT THEY CAN BECOME A REALITY."

AS FOR THE PRESIDENTIAL VISIT, THE SHAH WAS QUOTED AS SAYING 'I AM REALLY SATISFIED, JUST AS I WAS SATISFIED WITH MY VISIT TO THE UNITED STATES. I THINK THAT A VERY FIRM RELATIONSHIP HAS BEEN ESTABLISHED BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES. THIS IS AN OLD TRADITION IN THE TWO COUNTRIES' RELATIONS. IN ADDITION TO THE TWO COUNTRIES' RELATIONS AND THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THEIR LEADERS, WE ALSO HAVE AGREEMENTS; WE HAVE ALWAYS BEEN IN AGREEMENT AND RARELY IN DISAGREEMENT."

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3. DAYAN SAID THAT THE SHAH HAD TALKED TO HIM AT LENGTH ABOUT THE THREAT POSED BY INCREASING SOVIET ARMS SHIPMENTS TO IRAQ AND TO OTHER RADICAL ARAB STATES. THE SHAH SAID THAT THE SOVIETS HAVE ASSURED IRAQ THAT THE KURDS WILL NOT MAKE ANY TROUBLE FOR THEM IF IRAQ AND SYRIA TAKE MILITARY ACTIONS AGAINST ISRAEL IN THE NEAR FUTURE. DAYAN CLAIMED THAT THE SHAH WAS MUCH MORE WORRIED ABOUT THE POSSIBILITY OF SOVIET INSPIRED MILITARY MOVES AGAINST ISRAEL IN THE NEAR FUTURE THAN HE WAS. THE SHAH WAS LOOKING AT THE WHOLE EVOLVING SITUATION AS HAVING A GOOD DEAL MORE OF A SOVIET THREAT DIMENSION IN IT THAN HAD BEEN DAYAN'S VIEW. HE SAID THE SHAH WAS VERY GLOOMY. HE HAD STRESSED THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE VISIT BY THE SOVIET DEFENSE

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MINISTER RECENTLY TO LIBYA, SOVIET ARMS SHIPMENTS AND SUPPORT OF OTHERS OF THE RADICAL ARAB STATES, AND SO FORTH -- AND HAD INTERSPERSED HIS REMARKS WITH COMMENTS ABOUT HOW THE US WAS NOT SUFFICIENTLY CONCERNED AND WAS DOING NOTHING TO STEM THIS GROWING DANGER. THE SHAH TOLD DAYAN THAT HE HAD AN OUTSTANDING INVITATION TO GO TO EGYPT, AND HE WAS SERIOUSLY CONSIDERING GOING SOON HIMSELF TO SAUDI ARABIA, EGYPT AND JORDAN TO TRY TO BOLSTER THE RESOLVE OF THE MODERATE LEADERSHIP IN THOSE COUNTRIES TO MOVE RAPIDLY IN THE DIRECTION OF PEACE WITH ISRAEL. THE SHAH SAID, ACCORDING TO DAYAN, THAT WHILE HE DID NOT SUPPORT THE IDEA OF A SEPARATE EGYPTIAN-ISRAELI PEACE TREATY, HE WOULD SUPPORT IT AS A NECESSARY FALL-BACK IN VIEW OF THE GROWING SOVIET THREAT, UNLESS THE PALESTINIAN ISSUE COULD BE RESOLVED WITH JORDAN'S PARTICIPATION IN THE NEAR FUTURE. DAYAN SAID HE WAS SURPRISED THE SHAH NEVER MENTIONED JERUSALEM IN THIS CONVERSATION, BUT THAT HE INSISTED REPEATEDLY THAT THE WEST BANK PROBLEM HAD TO BE SETTLED IN A WAY WHICH WOULD PROVIDE A FIRM LINK TO JORDAN. THE SHAH HAD BEEN RELATIVELY LITTLE INTERESTED IN DAYAN'S EXPOSITION TO HIM OF THE DETAILS OF THE BEGIN PROPOSAL. HE WAS PREOCCUPIED RATHER WITH THE BROADER STRATEGIC PROBLEM OF THE SOVIET "OFFENSIVE VIA THE RADICAL ARABS."

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4. I SUGGEST THIS MESSAGE BE REPEATED TO TEHRAN FOR AMBASSADOR SULLIVAN, TO WARSAW FOR THE SECRETARY, BRZEZINSKI, AND ATHERTON, TO AMMAN FOR AMBASSADOR PICKERING AND TO CAIRO FOR AMBASSADOR EILTS. LEWIS UNQUOTE CHRISTOPHER

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CONFIDENTIAL

To: President Carter
From: Hamilton

On the way over, I had several hours in Cairo changing planes. I spent them with our Ambassador. And yesterday John West and I spent a couple of hours with Prince Saud, and, of course, I sat in on the meetings last night. Several observations:

1. Everyone agrees that Sadat needs something. The failure of the Ismailia meeting to produce anything for Sadat that would enable him to bring Jordan into the process and the ~~the~~ misinterpretation of your television comments last week (the perception in the Middle East is a change in U.S. foreign policy on the Palestinian question) make it that we do something to help him. The challenge is to do something that will maintain the momentum toward peace without disrupting the events and processes already underway. In this sense, it is important that what we do is more

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BY K.S. NARA ONE 3/21/13

than just a U.S. gesture and has some chance of success.

2. Everyone has known that at some point in time there would be a major U.S.-Israeli political confrontation. If this is it, so be it. However, we cannot sustain too many "crunches". And when we have the major ~~crunch~~ "crunch" with Israel, we need to succeed in the sense that the confrontation results in Israel making concessions which will greatly enhance the peace process. A major U.S. initiative now in the Middle East which does not partially succeed will hurt everyone. The Israelis will blame us for disrupting the peace process and the Arabs will say we have not used our maximum influence with Israel.

In this sense, I would hope that whatever our next move is, it would have some chance of ~~succeeding~~ succeeding.

3. The F-15 has come to be a tangible test of the quality of our relationship with the Saudis. It is seen as a measure of your willingness to fight in Congress for

Saudi Arabia. If the "paper" or "plan" discussed last night precipitates the major political debate in our country that I expect it will, the Saudis should know that this specific effort on the Middle East which we are undertaking (at their recommendation and with their support) might be pursued at the expense of the F-15. Cy was saying last night that Congressional approval was going to be very, very difficult. I don't think we have any choice but to proceed on the F-15, but if it is highly unlikely that we can succeed, the Saudis should know from the outset. Prince Saud said that a Congressional defeat would be a greater rebuff than their withdrawing the request and making the purchase from another country.

4. Just as the publicity surrounding the "Carter-Deagan working paper" made that document immediately unacceptable to the Arabs, we need to avoid creating the impression that this new "plan" or "declaration" is exclusively a product of this trip or a "U.S.-Arab proposal".

It would seem that major attention should be given to how and when it is publicly surfaced.

If it surfaces during the trip, our critics will say:

1) it ~~was~~ was done to counter the misimpression created in the Arab world by your statement last week;

2) it was done in response to the pressure exerted on you by the Arab leaders;

3) it was done to repay the Saudis for their strong support at Caracas for an oil price freeze.

5. For these reasons, two things seem very important. First, there are great disadvantages to surfacing this new "plan"

(during the trip) or "proposal". Secondly, we should consult with the Israelis at the earliest possible date to protect ourselves from the charge that this is a U.S.-Arab product and was done without consultation with the Israelis.

It will not be a secret if you tell Sadat. Consequently, you might "think aloud" with Sadat and tell him what you are considering. But that you will need to go back to the states for a few days before making a final decision or proposal.

In terms of your visit to Aswan, Sadat has a greater need for and interest in good pictures and warm words from you than a major new U.S. proposal. Just to hint in your comments afterwards that you made progress and have some new ideas for discussion at Jerusalem (when Cy goes later in the month) should satisfy his immediate needs.

6. If "self-determination" can be advanced as a ~~principle~~ principle of our Middle Eastern policy in the context of human rights and without presupposing the creation of an independent Palestinian state, we might have something. But when the term "self-determination" is used in conjunction with the phrase "creation of a Palestinian entity", it strongly implies or suggests that the product or result of self-determination will be an

autonomous and independent political unit.
To ignore the implication of the joint
use of these words and phrases is to
understate their true use and meaning
in the English language.

My concluding recommendation would be
that you verbalize these thoughts to Sadat,
make it plain you are only "considering"
this course of action, return to the states,
consult with the Israelis and let Cy
put this forward at Jerusalem.

Finally, I appreciate your letting me come.
As someone who is constantly exposed to
the pressures and political realities of the
U.S.-Israeli relationship, it is helpful
to see first hand the Arab perspective.

If you have no objections, I would
like to share this memo with Cy
and Zbig.

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FOR ATHERTON

FOL RPT AMMAN 9753 ACTION SECSTATE INFO BEIRUT CAIRO DAMASCUS
JIDDA TEL AVIV JERUSALEM 29 DEC 77 QUOTE

C O N F I D E N T I A L AMMAN 9753

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PGOV, JO, IS, EG, XF
SUBJECT: BEGIN PLAN - JORDANIAN REACTION

REF: FBIS JN 282125Y

1. REFTTEL CONTAINS TEXT OF JORDANIAN GOVERNMENT ANNOUNCEMENT OF CABINET DECISION WHICH CONSIDERED BEGIN PLAN. NO ONE WILL BE SURPRISED TO LEARN THAT JORDANIANS ARE NEGATIVE. ONE INTERESTING POINT IS PHRASE IN FINAL PARAGRAPH INDICATING THAT GOJ WILL NOT COOPERATE IN IMPLEMENTING SUCH A SETTLEMENT. WE BELIEVE THIS IS IN REPLY TO BEGIN'S SIGNALS OF INTEREST IN HAVING JORDAN JOIN THE NEGOTIATING EFFORT AND AS WELL TO PRESS COMMENTS FROM EUROPE AND THE UNITED STATES TO THE SAME EFFECT.

2. THE BEGIN PLAN AS PRESENTED TO THE JORDANIANS, VIA THE ISRAELI PRIME MINISTER'S SPEECH IN THE KNESSET OF DECEMBER 27, WAS NOT THE BEST FORUM OR CONTEXT IN WHICH TO HAVE IT VIEWED FOR THE FIRST TIME IN AMMAN. CLEARLY OUR IMPRESSION HERE WAS THAT SPEECH WAS LOADED WITH STATEMENTS TO RESPOND TO OR DEBATE BEGIN'S DOMESTIC CRITICS AND THUS REPRESENTED A PRESENTATION OF THE PLAN FOR THE ARABS AT ITS WORST. COURT CHIEF SHARAF ASSURED US EVENING OF DECEMBER 28 THAT JORDAN HAD NOT RECEIVED A BRIEFING ON THE SADAT-BEGIN MEETINGS FROM THE EGYPTIANS.

3. FOR THE JORDANIANS, THE KEY ELEMENT IN ANY FUTURE DECISION ON JOINING IN ANY NEGOTIATIONS WILL BE THE DEGREE TO WHICH THEY FIND THAT THERE IS A REASONABLE CHANCE OF RECOVERING TERRITORY ON THE WEST BANK. THEY SEEM ALSO TO HAVE RECOGNIZED THAT INTER-ARAB NEURALGIA OVER ANY ROLE FOR THEM WILL BE HIGH, ESPECIALLY AMONG THE PLO AND THE SYRIANS AND HAVE THUS INSISTED THAT ANY ROLE THEY PLAY WILL HAVE TO END IN SELF-DETERMINATION FOR THE PALESTINIANS. WE BELIEVE THERE IS A GREAT DEAL OF FLEXIBILITY IN THE JORDANIAN'S CONCEPTION OF WHAT WOULD CONSTITUTE SELF DETERMINATION, BUT IT IS A CONVENIENT SHIELD TO USE TO DEFEND THEMSELVES FROM EXPECTED ARAB ATTACK SHOULD THEY LATER MOVE INTO A NEGOTIATING ROLE.

4. THE BEGIN PLAN FOR THE MOMENT WILL ALSO HELP THE JORDANIANS IN THEIR RECENTLY STRAINED RELATIONS WITH SYRIANS. INDEED, JORDAN'S DENUNCIATION OF THE PROPOSALS COMES RIGHT AFTER A TRIP TO DAMASCUS BY THE JORDANIAN PRIME MINISTER AND COURT CHIEF AND COULD WELL HAVE BEEN CALCULATED TO REASSURE SYRIA THAT JORDAN WAS NOT TAKING A PLUNGE OFF THE DEEP END NOW WITH THE EGYPTIANS.

PICKERING

UNQUOTE CHRISTOPHER

BT
#0566

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BY K5 NARA DATE 3/21/13

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PRECEDENCE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CLASSIFICATION

FOR COMMCENTER USE ONLY

FROM: ~~SECRET~~ THE WHITE HOUSE
TO: SUSAN CLOUGH FOR THE
PRESIDENT

INFO: RICK INDERFURTH FOR
DR. BRZEZINSKI

RELEASED BY: 16

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BY K2 NARA DATE 3/21/13

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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FM THE SITUATION ROOM
TO SUSAN CLOUGH FOR THE PRESIDENT
ZEM

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ WHE0047

TO: THE PRESIDENT

FROM: SECRETARY BLUMENTHAL

1. THE EXCHANGE MARKETS HAVE BEEN VERY DISORDERLY TODAY, JANUARY 3, AND THE DOLLAR HAS DEPRECIATED SHARPLY AGAINST THE OTHER MAJOR CURRENCIES FOLLOWING SEVERAL DAYS OF PERSISTENT DECLINE. DURING THE COURSE OF THE DAY, THE SWISS FRANC ROSE BY NEARLY 4 PERCENT AGAINST THE DOLLAR, THE POUND STERLING AND FRENCH FRANC BY NEARLY 2 1/2 PERCENT, AND THE DM BY ALMOST 2 PERCENT. MARKET ACTIVITY WAS BELOW NORMAL AND THERE WERE SPECIAL FACTORS OPERATING SUCH AS THE FACT THIS WAS THE FIRST TRADING DAY FOLLOWING A LONG HOLIDAY PERIOD. NONETHELESS, EXCHANGE RATE MOVEMENTS OF THESE MAGNITUDES ARE A CAUSE OF CONSIDERABLE CONCERN, AND I AM QUITE WORRIED ABOUT THEM. THEY WILL BE THE SUBJECT OF A GREAT DEAL OF ATTENTION BY THE EUROPEAN PRESS AND THE OFFICIALS YOU WILL BE MEETING.
2. THE TREASURY/BUNDESBANK SWAP THAT TONY SOLOMON BRIEFED YOU ON OVER THE WEEKEND HAS BEEN APPROVED BY THE BUNDESBANK BUT, AT THEIR REQUEST, WILL NOT BE ANNOUNCED UNTIL THURSDAY MORNING (WASHINGTON TIME) AT THE EARLIEST. YOUR ECONOMIC ADVISORS ARE CONSULTING ON THE SITUATION AND OPTIONS. I WILL GIVE YOU A FURTHER REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS WITHIN 24 TO 48 HOURS.
3. MEANWHILE, IN ANY DISCUSSIONS WITH GISCARD AND OTHER OFFICIALS ABOUT THIS SITUATION, I WOULD SUGGEST YOU TAKE THE FOLLOWING APPROACH:
 - A. THAT WE ARE CONCERNED ABOUT THE DISORDER IN THE MARKETS AND THE RECENT SHARP MOVEMENTS OF THE DOLLAR;
 - B. THAT SECRETARY BLUMENTHAL, CHAIRMAN BURNS AND YOUR OTHER ECONOMIC ADVISORS ARE IN CLOSE TOUCH ON THIS QUESTION, AND ARE CONSIDERING WHETHER THERE IS A NEED TO TAKE MORE DRASTIC ACTION TO HELP STABILIZE THE IRZMS;
 - C. THAT THEY WILL OFCOURSE BE IN CLOSE TOUCH WITH THEIR EUROPEAN COUNTERPARTS ABOUT THE SITUATION AND WHAT ACTIONS MIGHT BE ADVISABLE. (YOU MAY WANT TO INFO GISCARD THAT TREASURY HAS REACHED AGREEMENT ON ESTABLISHMENT OF A NEW \$1 BILLION SWAP ARRANGEMENT WITH THE BUNDESBANK.)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

5. IN RESPONDING TO ANY PREED INQUIRY CONCERN THE SUBJECT, I WOULD SUGGEST THAT YOU:

A. EXPRESS CONCERN U1768

431305 #4000/HANGE RATE

MOVEMENTS, AND OUR CONVICTION THAT RECENT MARKET DISTURBANCES ARE NOT JUSTIFIED.

B. EMPHASIZE INTENT TO DEAL WITH ROOT CAUSES OF MARKET DISTURBANCES IN A DIRECT AND FUNDAMENTAL WAY, IN PARTICULAR TO ACHIEVE AN EFFECTIVE ENERGY PROGRAM AND MAINTAIN A HEALTHY, GROWING AND NON-INFLATIONARY U.S. ECONOMY.

C. EMPHASIZE OUR DETERMINATION TO PROTECT THE INTEGRITY OF THE DOLLAR AND TO TAKE ANY ACTION THAT MAY BE REQUIRED TO THAT END.

BLUMENTHAL

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O 310302Z DEC 77

FM THE SITUATION ROOM

TO TIM KRAFT FOR THE PRESIDENT

ZEM

~~SECRET EYES ONLY~~

*Received Warsaw
310317Z Dec 77*

~~SECRET EYES ONLY~~ DELIVER AT OPENING OF BUSINESS WH70733

DECEMBER 30, 1977

TO: THE PRESIDENT, WARSAW

FROM: HAMILTON JORDAN

IN RESPONSE TO YOUR CABLE AND YOUR REQUEST FOR MY ASSESSMENT OF A POSSIBLE MEETING WITH SADAT, I WOULD OFFER THESE OBSERVATIONS:

1. BY THE TIME YOU COMPLETE THE TRIP TO SAUDI ARABIA, YOU WILL HAVE MET IN THE LAST MONTH WITH LEADERS OF ALL THE PRINCIPALS IN THE MIDDLE EAST THAT HAVE BEEN WILLING TO MEET WITH YOU - BEGIN IN WASHINGTON, THE SHAH IN WASHINGTON AND IRAN, KING HUSSEIN IN IRAN AND KING KHALID IN SAUDI ARABIA - EXCEPT FOR SADAT, THE MAN WHO IS PERSONALLY RESPONSIBLE FOR OPENING THINGS UP.

2. IT HAS BEEN OVER SIX MONTHS SINCE YOU MET PERSONALLY WITH SADAT. AS WE HAVE RECENTLY SEEN, THERE WILL LIKELY BE SOME ROUGH TIMES AHEAD FOR BOTH SADAT AND BEGIN. I BELIEVE THAT IT WOULD BE GOOD TO REESTABLISH AND ENHANCE YOUR PERSONAL RELATIONSHIP WITH HIM. THIS IS SOMETHING THAT CAN ONLY BE DONE IN A FACE-TO-FACE MEETING. I DON'T KNOW WHEN CIRCUMSTANCES WILL PERMIT YOU TO SEE SADAT AGAIN AND WOULD STRONGLY RECOMMEND THAT YOU TAKE ADVANTAGE OF YOUR PRESENCE IN THE AREA TO VISIT HIM.

3. AS RELATES TO THE LOCATION OF THIS MEETING, I WOULD THINK THAT IT WOULD BE MUCH BETTER FOR YOU TO GO TO HIM THAN ASK THAT HE MEET YOU IN A THIRD COUNTRY. YOUR TRIP TO EGYPT WOULD COME AT A TIME WHEN THERE IS A GROWING REALIZATION AMONG THE PEOPLE IN THIS COUNTRY AND PROBABLY IN THE MIDDLE EAST THAT THE PROBLEMS FACING BOTH BEGIN AND SADAT ARE REAL AND DO NOT LEND THEMSELVES TO EASY SOLUTIONS. YOUR ALTERING YOUR TRIP TO VISIT SADAT WOULD UNDOUBTEDLY HELP HIM IN EGYPT AND THROUGHOUT THE ARAB WORLD.

4. AS RELATES TO AMERICAN PUBLIC OPINION, I BELIEVE THAT THE AMERICAN PEOPLE SEE A MUTUALITY OF INTERESTS THAT NOW EXISTS BETWEEN SADAT AND BEGIN. GIVEN BEGIN'S RECENT VISIT

END OF PAGE 01

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ESDN: NLC-126-10-15-8-6

BY RS NARA DATE 3/21/13

~~SECRET EYES ONLY~~

~~SECRET EYES ONLY~~

HERE, I BELIEVE THAT THE TRIP TO EGYPT WOULD BE WELL
RECEIVED HERE IN THE STATES.

5. ANOTHER OBSERVATION I WOULD MAKE IS THAT THE MIDDLE EAST
CONTINUES TO DOMINATE THE NEWS COVERAGE IN THE U.S. THE LEAD
ON MOST OF THE NETWORKS TONIGHT WAS FOCUSED ON WHAT YOU SAID
AND DID IN POLAND THAT RELATED TO THE MIDDLE EAST. SO, FOR
BETTER OR WORSE, YOUR TRIP HAS TAKEN ON A MIDDLE EASTERN
DIMENSION THAT COULD BE REINFORCED BY A STOP-OFF IN
EGYPT.

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ESDN: NLC-126-10-15-8-6

BY JKS NARA DATE 3/21/13

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FM THE VICE PRESIDENT

TO THE PRESIDENT VIA SUSAN CLOUGH

ZEM

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ DELIVER AT OPENING OF BUSINESS WH80021

AS YOU THINK ABOUT HOW THE CROWN OF ST. STEPHEN WILL BE RETURNED, I HOPE YOU WOULD CONSIDER WHETHER IT IS WISE TO SEND ROSALYN ALONG WITH CY. I KNOW SHE WOULD DO A GOOD JOB BUT IT WOULD ALSO MAKE IT EASIER FOR CRITICS TO ATTACK YOU PERSONALLY ON THIS ISSUE. I BELIEVE THAT CY WOULD GIVE THE RETURN APPROPRIATE STATURE AND DIGNITY WITHOUT OPENING UP ADDITIONAL OPPORTUNITIES FOR YOUR CRITICS.

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To V Pres.
Unfortunately, Rosalynn will have
~~I agree~~
to stay with the Queen of
Belgium while Vance goes on with
the crown to Hungary - Best wishes
Jimmy

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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ESDN: NLG-126-10-15-1-3
BY 155 NARA DATE 3/20/13

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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FM PETER KYROS
TO PHIL WISE
ZEM

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ WH70721

TEHRAN 11492

E.O. 11652: N/A
TAGS: OVIP (CARTER, JIMMY)

SUBJ: MESSAGE FROM THE SHAH

COURT HAS ASKED THAT THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM THE SHAH TO THE PRESIDENT BE DELIVERED BEFORE THE PRESIDENT ARRIVES HERE. QUOTE. THE HONOURABLE JIMMY CARTER, PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA. ON THE OCCASION OF THE NEW YEAR, THE SHAHBANOU AND I TAKE GREAT PLEASURE IN CONVEYING TO YOU, MR PRESIDENT AND MRS CARTER OUR WARMEST GREETINGS TOGETHER WITH OUR SINCERE BEST WISHES FOR YOUR GOOD HEALTH HAPPINESS AND CONTINUED SUCCESS IN THE SERVICE OF THE NOBLE AMERICAN PEOPLE AND IN THE REALIZATION OF OUR MUTUAL ASPIRATIONS FOR WORLD PEACE, SECURITY AND HUMAN PROGRESS. WE BOTH LOOK FORWARD VERY MUCH TO THE PLEASURE OF WELCOMING YOU IN TEHRAN ON SATURDAY. WITH OUR KINDEST REGARDS, SINCERELY, MOHAMMAD REZA PAHLAVI. END QUOTE. SULLIVAN

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Per, Rac Project
ESDN: NLC-126-10-15-4-0
BY KS NARA DATE 3/21/13

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MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT
FROM: Cyrus Vance *ccv*
SUBJECT: Your Meeting with King Hussein in Tehran

Your Objective

Your overall objective in meeting with Hussein in Tehran will be to discuss with him when and on what terms Jordan should join Egypt and Israel in their talks on the Palestinian question. Begin and Dayan have told us that they want Jordan to join the talks. Presumably Sadat does, too, though we do not yet know Sadat's thinking on the precise circumstances and timing of Jordan's coming in.

The West Bank/Gaza problem will be the major issue confronting the Egyptians and the Israelis in their upcoming round of negotiations. Sooner or later, Jordan's presence at these negotiations will be necessary if a satisfactory solution is to be worked out, since only through linkage of the West Bank and Gaza with Jordan can Israel be assured that these areas will not become an independent state.

Hussein has already been thinking about when and how he might join the talks. He will stress the risks that this step will involve for him and the need to assure an outcome that a majority of Arabs would find just, i.e., ultimate self-determination and separation of the West Bank and Gaza from Israel. He will want to share these concerns with you and get your views on the role that Jordan should play. The Tehran meeting will give you the opportunity to help him think the problem through and chart his course over the next few weeks.

Background

The Egyptian-Israeli negotiations put Hussein squarely on the horns of a dilemma. Basically he wants to join these talks, to play what he considers his rightful role and to get back the West Bank (he would take Gaza, too).

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BY KS NARA DATE 3/20/13

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But he fears the consequences of the break with Syria that this would involve, and he is reluctant to seem to be going against the December 1974 Rabat Arab Summit Decision which recognized the PLO as the sole representative of the Palestinians. Hussein has vivid memories of the difficult times he went through in the early 1970s when Jordan was first invaded by Syria and then boycotted and incessantly attacked over the airwaves and in the press by Syria and Iraq. It is very unlikely that he would have to face another Syrian invasion, but he knows that Syria and Iraq can make life unpleasant for him without resorting to such extreme measures.

Hussein made clear in our meeting in Amman earlier this month that while he would face many difficulties in doing so, he would be willing to negotiate for the West Bank and Gaza under certain circumstances. He said he would insist on self-determination for the area; this would be necessary to give legitimacy to a renewal of ties with Jordan. And he says he would negotiate only if he could get back the entire territory, including Jerusalem. Clearly Hussein hopes to drive a hard bargain, for he will need to be able to show the Saudis and the Palestinians that he has gotten a good price for stepping into the negotiations. He may believe that the Israelis and the Egyptians need him more than he needs them. But, on the other hand, Hussein feels that Sadat's failure would be a disaster for the Arab moderates. He recognizes that it is in his interest to help Sadat succeed.

The revised plan that Begin presented to Sadat on December 25 contains a provision for a Jordanian role in the proposed self-rule regime for the West Bank/Gaza. Hussein does not regard the Israeli proposal as a basis for him to join the negotiations, but he will appreciate that it can with modifications provide a basis for his participation. For their part, the Israelis realize that they will need Jordan if they are to be able to work out a solution to the West Bank/Gaza problem that would be satisfactory to Sadat. Israel will have a difficult enough time deciding to divest itself ultimately of the West Bank and Gaza; only if links between these areas and Jordan can be worked out will it be able to do so. Preparing the way for such an arrangement is likely to be our major task in the period ahead.

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Strategy With Hussein

You will have only about an hour with Hussein and will thus not be able to go into great detail. He will have word from Sadat on the December 25 meeting but what Sadat tells him may not be complete and, in any case, he will want our assessment of where things stand and what his next steps should be. Hussein will also want to share with you his concern over the difficulties he anticipates from Syria and the rejectionists if he does join the negotiations, and to have your assurance that we will support him. It will be particularly important to him to know that we understand the risks he will be taking and that he can count on our backing.

The following are points that you will want to cover in your talk with Hussein:

-- First of all, you will want to share with Hussein our appreciation of the December 25 Sadat-Begin talks and to stress that despite the differences that surfaced in that meeting we think the way is open for agreement. What is needed is time for the parties to negotiate and to make the necessary adjustments in their positions.

-- You will want to express understanding for the course Hussein has followed up to now. We have many times told him that he should keep his lines open to Syria and use his influence with Assad to help bring Syria into the negotiations. As he knows, we are doing the same.

-- But a time will come - perhaps within the next few weeks - when it will be important for Jordan to assume a role in the negotiations. We have always felt that the future of the West Bank lies in some form of union with Jordan; we have repeatedly stated that we do not believe that an independent West Bank state is desirable.

-- We recognize that the Begin proposal for the West Bank and Gaza would not be viewed by Hussein as an acceptable basis for Jordan's joining the negotiations. The problem is how to bring about changes in this proposal and pave the way for Jordan's entry into the negotiations.

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-- What sort of arrangement would Hussein envisage in regard to Jordan's joining the negotiations? Would Jordan be willing, for example, to join with Egypt and Israel in a transitional regime for the West Bank and Gaza pending some form of self-determination?

-- The Israelis and Egyptians have told us that they favor Jordanian participation in the talks. Hussein might want to use his private channels to discuss this directly with Sadat and the Israelis; alternatively, we would be happy to pass messages for them. But first we think Hussein should consult with Sadat. It will be important for Hussein to have Sadat's views on how and when he should join in the talks. (Hussein may take a harder line with the Israelis than Sadat would; prior coordination between the two could help in moderating Hussein's stance.)

-- Finally, you should make clear that we understand the risks that Hussein will run in joining the negotiations and assure him that we will support him. He may ask for assurance that we will expedite shipment of certain items of military equipment - his present concern is artillery - and that we will continue our supporting assistance and our participation in Jordan's economic development programs at least at their current levels.

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MESSAGE TO THE PRESIDENT IMMEDIATE
FROM SECRETARY BLUMENTHAL

1. Following further discussions with the Germans,
ikx it has been agreed that the following announcement will
(Washington time)
be released at 1:15 p.m./ today, January 4:

The United States Treasury and the Federal Reserve Board issued
the following announcement:

The Exchange Stabilization Fund of the United States Treasury
will hence forth be utilized actively ^{together} in coordination with the
\$20 billion swap network operated by the Federal Reserve System.
A swap agreement has just been reached by the Treasury with the
Deutsche Bundesbank and is already in force. Joint intervention by the
Treasury, ^{IN CLOSE CONSULTATION} and the Federal Reserve, ~~in close consultation~~ with foreign
central banks, is designed to check speculation and re-establish
order in the foreign exchange markets.

2. Note that ~~XXXXXXXXXX~~ Treasury amount of/swap, \$1 billion,
is not mentioned. This is for reasons of market tactics. If
pressed, we may later have to indicate ^{on background basis} that the swap is
"in the initial amount of \$1 billion, to be supplemented if
necessary." Reference to \$20 billion Fed swap network is
with a number of countries, including Germa-
to swap lines already in existence/~~XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX~~ The
Fed swap network is publicly known.

*in the
amount of
\$2 billion.*

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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ESDN: NLC-126-10-15-3-1
BY: K6 NARA DATE 3/21/03

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FM THE SITUATION ROOM//SITTO 124//
TO INDERFURTH FOR DR. BRZEZINSKI
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SITTO 124

JANUARY 30, 1978

TO: ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI
FROM: DAVID AARON

VICE PRESIDENT WOULD APPRECIATE GUIDANCE ON THEMES HE SHOULD STRESS IN HIS WELCOMING REMARKS TO THE PRESIDENT THIS EVENING. WOULD APPRECIATE RESPONSE SOONEST.

I ALSO WANTED TO REMIND YOU OF OUR ORIGINAL PLAN TO STRESS ENERGY IN CONNECTION WITH THE PRESIDENT'S TRIP AND SUGGEST THAT THE PRESIDENT'S RETURN COMMENTS COULD TAKE THE LINE THAT IN EVERY CAPITAL HE WAS PRESSED FOR AMERICA TO GET ON WITH ITS CONSERVATION PROGRAM. HE COULD TIE THIS TO THE DEFENSE OF THE DOLLAR POINTING OUT THAT THE ENERGY BILL IS A CRUCIAL ELEMENT IN PROTECTING THE SOUNDNESS OF OUR CURRENCY. FINALLY, HE COULD SAY (AS WAS DISCUSSED EARLIER IN THE EPG), THAT HE WAS PLANNING TO CALL THE ENERGY CONFEREES TOGETHER NEXT WEEK TO GET THE BILL MOVING AGAIN.

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*Should I give a copy to
Fallows?*

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BY KS NARA DATE 3/21/13

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CC WTER
OF WTE 06599 3631646
O 291652Z DEC 77
FM PETER KYROS
TO PHIL WISE

ZEM

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ WH73721

TEHRAN 11402

Z.O. 116322 N/A

TAGS: OVIP (CARTER, JIMMY)

SUBJ: MESSAGE FROM THE SHAH

COURT HAS ASKED THAT THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM THE SHAH TO THE PRESIDENT BE DELIVERED BEFORE THE PRESIDENT ARRIVES HERE. QUOTE. THE HONOURABLE JIMMY CARTER, PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA. ON THE OCCASION OF THE NEW YEAR, THE SHAHBANOU AND I TAKE GREAT PLEASURE IN CONVEYING TO YOU, MR PRESIDENT AND MRS CARTER OUR WARMEST GREETINGS TOGETHER WITH OUR SINCERE BEST WISHES FOR YOUR GOOD HEALTH HAPPINESS AND CONTINUED SUCCESS IN THE SERVICE OF THE NOBLE AMERICAN PEOPLE AND IN THE REALIZATION OF OUR MUTUAL ASPIRATIONS FOR WORLD PEACE, SECURITY AND HUMAN PROGRESS. WE BOTH LOOK FORWARD VERY MUCH TO THE PLEASURE OF WELCOMING YOU IN TEHRAN ON SATURDAY. WITH OUR KINDEST REGARDS, SINCERELY, MOHAMMAD REZA PAHLAVI, END QUOTE. SULLIVAN

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